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Abstract 
 This research project is an examination of the organization and behavior of 
criminal group activity in the region of West Africa. An assessment of the size, structure, 
and type of criminal enterprises these groups are involved in are investigated.  It is also 
uncovered if and how groups make use of corruption, the legit economy, and influence 
politicians. The environment in which transnational crime is able to thrive is also of 
great interest as the social, political, economic, and technological changes that occurred 
alongside the sudden trend in transnational crime activity are considered.   The 
information is used to generate a discussion about the nature of transnational crime 
and why it continues to thrive in this particular area. Finally the question is raised if 
whether there is an alternative way to try and understand the reality of transnational 
crime and the individuals involved. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In a global economy neo conservative and neo liberal economic ideologies of laissez 
faire enforce markets to expand in order to maximize profits (Kraska, 2004). The free 
unregulated competitive market is understood as the ideal model for a social order that 
supports the freedom of choice, including choice in relation to consumption.  There is 
also a strong emphasis on cost-effective, results based, government coupled with 
accountability at all levels (O’Malley, 1999).  This sort of free market network 
perpetuates the mass movement of goods and services and the development of 
business enterprises capable to adjust, function, and compete in a global economy.   
This type of free market agenda is the most common economic framework newly 
independent countries adopt in attempt to construct democratic sovereign nation-
states. Western governments believe modernization is a process that brings 
impoverished countries into a new era of economic growth and prosperity.  Neo 
conservatives and neo-liberals promote the idea if the new nations adopt social and 
political structures similar to Western industrial economies the tide of modernization 
will push them along the transformative process (Kraska, 2004). West Africa is made up 
of a conjunction of very young states including Senegal, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, The Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, Benin, and Togo all of which since 
independence from colonial rule have adopted social and political structures similar to 
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the West. These new sovereign nation-states are then thrust through the process of 
modernization in which citizens experience urbanization, a decline in agricultural 
populations, the loss of tribal customs, the rise of the nuclear family and the 
manifestations of such social problems such as slums and urban poverty. This rapid 
economic change reduces the stability of the traditional cultures and can cause several 
conditions, which promote crime (Brillon, 1973). Even though most of these nations 
have problems with violent conflict funded by the illegal trade of goods, free trade laws 
enable and encourage people in this region to move freely across international borders.  
The National institute of Justice defines transnational crime as premeditated group 
criminal activity that crosses national borders. These illicit ventures more specifically 
may include money laundering, human smuggling, cybercrime, and the trafficking of 
humans, drugs, weapons, endangered species, body parts, or nuclear material (Voronin, 
2000). The trend of planned illicit business ventures conducted by individuals working in 
more than one country within the region of West Africa is unique to similar activity 
other places in the world because it is a rather new phenomenon.  Law enforcement 
agencies in West Africa work hard to intercept, arrest, and punish those individuals 
believed to be involved in transnational crime, but due to lack of collaboration, 
corruption, and ethnic division law enforcement tends to be weak if not nonexistent 
(Ebbe, 1999). There is very little research on transnational crime groups in West Africa, 
which makes this area of particular interest to investigate.  Africa, as a whole, is raising 
global concern, as this area is now a transit point for illicit commodities, as it remains to 
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have problems with violent conflict and civil unrest (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, 2001).  The 
purpose of this thesis is to try and better understand not only the behavior of the 
individuals involved in West African transnational crime but also the environment in 
which it thrives. In the study of transnational crime it is necessary to identify some of 
the social, political, economic, and technological changes that occurred alongside the 
sudden trend of transnational crime activity.   What has contributed to the sudden 
increase in the number of young entrepreneurs who engage or will engage in some type 
of criminal activity at some level that makes it necessary to cross national borders? Why 
is it also more common and possible for young entrepreneurs to profit both illegally and 
legally off one or several illicit and legitimate transnational enterprises at once?   
It is necessary to conduct a content analysis of the research and available 
information on transnational crime in the West African Region in order to help 
determine the sizes and structures of transnational crime groups here, the type of 
criminal enterprises these groups are involved in, if and how they make use of 
corruption, the legit economy, and influence politicians. The information is used to 
generate a discussion about the nature of transnational crime and why it continues to 
thrive in this particular area.  Finally the question is raised if whether there might be 
other ways to try and understand the reality of transnational crime and the individuals 
involved.  If so, how might an alternative understanding change the way government 
officials combat transnational crime in not only West Africa, but also other regions of 
the world?  
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The next chapter begins with a brief review of some of the literature on 
organized crime to help to connect previous organized crime research with the current 
study of transnational criminal activity in West Africa.  Since transnational crime 
involves the collaboration of individuals, what does earlier research on organized crime 
reveal about criminal collaborative enterprises? 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Knowledge on transnational crime with the criminal justice discipline stems from 
three different paradigms that focus on the structure of organized crime groups.  A 
model, or paradigm, is an effort to draw a picture of a piece of reality in order to 
understand it better (Albanese, 2007). The very definition of “organized crime” is, 
however, debatable as the phrase itself is rather generic and includes a wide variety of 
criminal behavior. How one defines organized crime is extremely important because the 
definition helps to shape perspective which influences the conduction of research, the 
creation of laws against it, the investigation process, the conduction of prosecutions, 
and the provision of mutual legal assistance across national borders (Finckenauer, 
2005). The paradigms for organized crime address the characteristics, behavior, and 
structure of criminal groups in order to define and make sense of their behavior in order 
to identify a cause or the causes of their actions. 
Hierarchal Model 
Traditional law enforcement perspectives on organized crime in the United 
States and Canada in the 1960s reflected ideas of tightly organized, singular, alien 
conspiratorial groups (Beare, Naylor 1999).  The Hierarchical Model of Organized Crime 
portrays crime groups to arrange in order of rank or grade.  This model was put forth 
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first in these terms by Estes Kefauver, a U.S. Senator who conducted hearings on the 
subject of organized crime in 1950 but it wasn’t until 1963 that evidence was produced 
to support this theory. It was Senator John McClellan that held public hearings during 
this time and presented the government’s first “insider” on organized crime. The insider 
was Joseph Valachi who testified organized crime was composed of “family” structures 
with graded ranks of authority from boss down to soldiers with the bosses being 
responsible to oversee the activities of family members.  A “commission” of bosses 
handles inter-family relations and disputes (Albanese, 2007). The terms kingpin and 
mafia were officially coined to describe a criminal mastermind and a family of criminal 
cohorts.  This paradigm supports the notion the arrest of key individuals will dismantle 
entire criminal organizations and help combat criminal group activity.  
Local, Ethnic Model  
Critiques and alternative paradigms began to arise in the 1970s along with a 
growing body of scholarly research conducted under the subject heading of organized 
crime.  The Local, Ethnic Model of organized crime finds criminal relations to exist 
among naturally occurring friendships based on cultural and economic ties (Albini, 
1975).  Studies during this time also found cultural and ethnic ties link organized crime 
groups rather than a hierarchical structure and appear rather local in nature without 
apparent connections to a national crime syndicate (Albanese, 2007).  This paradigm 
describes organized crime groups as family oriented business like organizations made up 
of only those individuals who possess certain ethnic qualities or cultural backgrounds.  
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The differences between different ethnic backgrounds determine what type of crime a 
group is involved in and to what extend an individual is involved.  This paradigm is often 
used in unison with the first paradigm because it supports the notion organized crime is 
“family” based. It is not surprising, however, for families bound with close personal 
relationships due to kinship or camaraderie to trust one another enough to conspire 
together and engage in organized crime. This paradigm helps to validate the existence 
of The Russian Mafia and La Costa Nostra or the Italian Mafia, which alienates certain 
individuals.  It is important to remember, however, this paradigm understands 
individuals to control their own activities and take partners as they wish, which 
promotes the idea groups are less strictly structured. The phenomenon of transnational 
crime as a whole, however, breaks the boundaries of ethnicity.  Groups involved in 
transnational criminal activity often collaborate with individuals of various ethnicities in 
order to minimize risk, maximize profit, and facilitate market expansion much like any 
other legitimate transnational business (Potter, 1994).  
Business Enterprise Model  
The Business Enterprise Model understands organized crime groups conspire just 
like any other business enterprise.  A growing number of investigations find various 
types of relationships exist between individuals involved in transnational crime.  
Whether they are hierarchical in nature or based on ethnic commonalities or friendship, 
interpersonal relationships form the genesis of organized criminal activity. Researchers 
who adhere to this school of thought believe if the factors that cause illicit relationships 
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to form are isolated; a determination about the true causes of organized crime can be 
made. It is the conspiratorial nature of organized crime that makes it so serious.  It is not 
the individual drug dealer or the illegal casino operator that cause public concern, as 
much as how these individuals organize their customers, suppliers, and functionaries to 
provide illicit goods and services for profit (Potter, 1994).  The same fundamental 
assumptions that govern entrepreneurship in the legitimate capitalist marketplace such 
as the necessity to maintain and extend one’s financial net worth, also govern the 
illegitimate marketplace.   
Organized crime groups form and thrive in the same way that legitimate 
businesses do by responding to the needs and demands of suppliers, customers, 
regulators, and competitors in order to generate a profit. The business enterprise model 
of organized crime focuses on how capitalist economic considerations, rather than 
hierarchal or ethnic relationships lie at the base of the formation and success of 
organized crime groups.  Regardless of ethnicity or hierarchy, the Enterprise Model 
labels economic concerns as the primary cause of organized criminal behavior 
(Albanese, 2007).  Dealers and smugglers are found to operate within an illicit market 
that is largely competitive and disorganized rather than visibly structured.  Disputes are 
often settled in a spontaneous and unrestricted manner (Adler, 2000).  A study on 
bookmaking, loan sharking, and numbers gambling in New York City finds that economic 
forces arising from the illegality of the product tend to fragment the market making it 
very difficult to legally control or centralize these activities on a large scale (Albanese, 
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2007).  The supply of illegal goods is not marketed by a tendency toward the 
development of large-scale criminal enterprises, due to the illegal nature of the product.  
Instead, smaller, more flexible and efficient enterprises characterize organized crime 
(Paoli, 2002). The networking necessary to generate good business in the legit business 
world is also necessary for the illicit business world.   
How involved individuals structure themselves and collaborate to enable 
international market expansion and profitability remains open to interpretation by the 
researcher. Since transnational crime is a rather new phenomenon in West Africa, it is 
important take into consideration the similar criminal activity that has long taken place 
in some other regions of the world and to see if and how the above three paradigms are 
reinforced in the descriptions.  
Russian Crime 
Russian crime groups are defined by the threat and use of violence necessary to 
gain and maintain control of criminal markets. Retributive violence is often used within 
and between criminal groups to settle disputes.  The distinctiveness of Russian crime 
groups is the degree to which their influence has become embedded in the Post Soviet 
political system.  The global move from state regulated to an unregulated free market 
economy has created a challenge to legal systems around the world.  The political and 
economic forces around the globe determine to some extent the nature of criminal 
activities and with the spread of capitalism, rapid economic change seems to occur 
along with a surge in the scope of illegal actions carried out by citizens.  Privatization of 
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state property has positioned the current international focus on Russian crime (Beare, 
2000).  The economic structure of a sovereign nation has a drastic impact on the type of 
activities carried out by individual citizens such as whether they act alone or in 
collaboration with others.   
Bureaucrats, underground businesspersons, and professional criminals act as key 
agents and beneficiaries of the economic “liberation”.  These three tiers result from an 
economy in which the government could not ensure the citizenry access to basic 
necessities needed for everyday survival.  The unpredictable economy of Russia created 
the perfect environment for criminals with similar past experiences from the Soviet 
Union to flourish. Crime was seen as a necessary means to an end (Finckenauer & 
Waring, 2001, Beare 2000). This sense of instability is what also makes the structure of 
Russian crime groups different from groups believed to function like the La Cosa Nostra.  
It is conceived that Soviet Union criminals operate mostly as individual specialists 
instead of the traditional hierarchy structures.  This suggests that the Russian crime 
groups are not rigidly authoritarian and those involved do not answer to anyone in 
particular.    
 Russia is believed to pose a large threat to the West, the United States in 
particular, in which roughly 15 groups composed of 500-600 members are currently 
operating out of.  This degree of infiltration into the United States resulted in the US law 
enforcement strategy for Russian crime groups outlined by the Assistant Attorney 
General in charge of the justice department’s Criminal Division in 1999 (Voronin, 2001).  
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These varied criminal groups are extensively involved in a broad array of frauds and 
scams including health care fraud, insurance scams, stock frauds, antique swindles, 
forgery, and fuel tax evasion schemes.  Russians have also become the principle ethnic 
group involved credit card fraud in the United States.  The laundering of huge profits 
being made abroad is increasing its penetration into legitimate sectors of the global 
economy (Waring, 2001).    Even though they have the finances to do so, there is no 
evidence any of these groups have penetrated the United States political system 
(Finckenauer, 2001, 2007).  Russia then, very similarly to West Africa has experienced a 
rise in criminal activity abroad while attempting to adapt to what are understood 
ideologically as democratic customs politically, economically, and socially. 
Asia and the Pacific Region Criminal Groups 
Social disorganization due to large-scale immigration in the Asia and Pacific 
region has disrupted families and resulted in economic instability and social stress.  The 
unequal distribution of opportunities for legitimate economic advancement combined 
with the high value given to material gain has fostered widespread illegal activities to 
increase wealth.  Corporate deviance and crime have increased as domestic enterprises 
have multiplied, foreign investments have grown, and multinational corporations have 
expanded to Asia and the Pacific.  As government bureaucrats increase their influence 
on economic activities in many Asian and Pacific countries, corruption of public officials 
follows.  The three major drug production bases and the largest drug consumer market 
in the world are located in this region, making drug smuggling a significant problem.  
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Human trafficking and illegal immigration are prevalent in the region due to uneven 
economic development, natural disasters, political instability, military uprising, cultural 
clashes, as well as social instability (Shaw, 2003).  Capitalism advancing and socialism 
retreating at both national and international levels only seems to cause economic and 
social gaps which weakens state and societal controls on socioeconomic problems. 
The Fuk Ching Chinese crime group, which emerged in New York City in the 
1980s, comprised of Chinese individuals seeking to enter into the global economy for 
their own financial and material self interests.  Currently the Fuk Ching is estimated to 
have approximately 35 members with another 20 members in prison.  Experts agree 
that the Fuk Ching, like other Chinese gangs do not have the connections and 
sophistication necessary to corrupt U.S. police and judges (Ko-lin Chin & Finckenauer, 
2004).  Although Fuk Ching has some ability to manipulate the political system through 
corruption in the Fujian Province with respect to their human trafficking, there is no 
evidence the Fuk Ching has corrupted the political process of the United States.  This 
group mainly operates extortion and protection rackets in defined neighborhoods in 
New York’s Chinatown, with victims being mostly businesses.  The transnational activity 
of the group consists of the smuggling of migrants across national borders and human 
trafficking that includes coercion and exploitation in the destination country 
(Finckenauer, 2006).   
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The Criminal Groups of the Netherlands 
Understanding how criminals are able to work together undetected is the first 
fundamental step in creating policy to counteract transnational crime.  After assessing 
the evidence of corruption, violence, and intimidation, and the interaction between 
crime groups and the legal economy in the Netherlands, one may conclude the concept 
of “mafia type” crime families contradicts the literature on crime groups in the 
Netherlands.  An alternative theoretical framework concerning crime groups widely 
accepted in Dutch policy and research circles recognizes the primary business of 
“organized crime” is “transit crime” (international illegal trade, using the same 
opportunity structure that facilitates legal economic activities).  This contrasts with the 
view that organized crime is interested in controlling economic sectors or regions.   
Crime groups should instead be viewed as “criminal networks” rather than pyramidal 
structures (Kleemens, 2007; Kleemans & Bunt, 2007).  A study to examine the nature, 
seriousness, and scope of organized crime in St. Maarten, located in the Netherlands 
Antilles, found that many individuals on the island are involved in the transportation of 
drugs.  People of different nationalities in St. Maarten are involved and work together in 
a more or less organized manner making use of long term and temporary collaborations. 
Legit businesses also carry out roles of specialization in the illicit drug trade (Verhoeven, 
Bokhorst, Leeuw, Bogaerts, Scotborgh-vn de Van, 2007).    Criminal group activity here 
does not coincide with the theory of the large and highly structured mafia style groups.  
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Columbian Crime Groups  
The Columbian cocaine trade is characterized by a fluid social system with 
flexible exchange networks that expand and contract in response to market 
opportunities and regulatory constraints.  This durable elastic structure developed over 
many years as entrepreneurs built their enterprises through the establishment of 
personal contacts, repeated exchanges, and resources they accumulated gradually.  
They drew on socioeconomic traditions, such as contraband smuggling, that extend far 
back into Columbia’s colonial past.  Nodes that consist of individuals and groups make 
up Columbian drug trafficking networks.  Some nodes consist of brokers who facilitate 
transactions between various parties, while other nodes are composed of several 
individuals who function as a unit and engage in various smuggling rings and distribution 
cells that transport and sell drugs.  These social networks of individuals and groups are 
embedded within and across larger organizational networks.  Social networks 
decentralize decision-making authority and rely on brokers and intermediaries to buffer 
entrepreneurs themselves from direct complicity in criminal activity.  To combat these 
criminal nodes the Columbian National Police have in fact targeted more than 300 
“kingpins” for capture (Kenney, 2007).  The fact there are so many alleged bosses is an 
indication that the cartel concept was flawed from the beginning.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
A content analysis of accessible information and previous research on 
transnational crime in West Africa is placed under review and considered for this 
project.  This type of analysis is helpful when one attempts to identify patterns, themes, 
biases, and meanings related to a certain topic (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005; Neuendorf, 
2002).  By maintaining the focus on the region of West Africa, instead of Africa as an 
entire continent, more attention is paid to individual interceptions and arrests to better 
reveal any trends of transnational criminal activity.   
Difficulties of Transnational Crime Research 
 Transnational crime research has always posed considerable problems for the 
obvious reasons.  Data is extremely hard to come by and is often obtained from police 
sources that are often less than fully adequate. Also, the criminals involved in 
transnational crime activity do not easily cooperate in academic research due to their 
wish to remain anonymous, unknown, and undetectable. This research is primarily a 
descriptive analysis, which adds to the general baseline of case studies, which will 
promote a fuller understanding of transnational crime in general.  Ideally, by reviewing a 
good number of previous documented academic, government, and private 
organizational research on transnational crime and then comparing this literature to 
criminal records, data, and journalistic accounts a more accurate portrayal of the reality 
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in which criminals are able to engage in illicit enterprises at a transnational scale is 
possible.         
Little baseline data exist on transnational crime due to the fact law enforcement 
agencies often do not keep recorded data on arrests or interceptions of illicit goods and 
in the case of West Africa, even fewer research is recorded in English, so many of the 
significant details may be hindered by difficulties in translation.  A growing body of 
literature points to the methodological difficulties associated with studying illicit and 
therefore hidden activities, including those related to transnational crime. These include 
the requirement to collect data from multiple sources, the difficulties of doing so, and 
the challenge of drawing conclusions based on fragmentary data (Rawlinson, 1999; 
Winlow, Hobbs, Lister, & Hadfield, 2001).  In regard to transnational crime itself, there is 
a rather small specialist literature in the academic field of criminology and sociology, but 
even fewer such works are found that fully engage in the circumstances and experience 
of transnational criminal activity in West Africa (Ellis, 2003).  Past research also tends to 
make generalizing assumptions about the cause of transnational crime based on the few 
individuals who are intercepted by police agencies.  The individual actors involved 
become the problem instead of perhaps an inability for new governments to ensure all 
the basic necessities for life are made accessible to the population. 
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Sources 
In regard to certain types of serious crime, specifically in regards to drug-
trafficking, non-African sources of statistics were identified for this project.  This is a 
crime to which governments in Europe and the United States devote a considerable 
amount of attention to and the type of crime West African groups reportedly play an 
important role in.  For example, in the United States the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) finds that Trafficking groups composed of West African criminals 
smuggle South East Asian heroin to the United States.  Nigerian criminals have been 
most active in US cities such as Atlanta, Baltimore, Houston, New York City, Dallas, New 
York City, Newark, Chicago, and Washington D.C.  Chicago, just over the past several 
years, has actually become a hub for heroin trafficking controlled by Nigerian criminals 
who primarily deal in Asian heroin (Potter, 1994).  Various United States government 
agencies publish both analyses and statistics concerning West African participation in 
the global drug trade.  The Federation of American Scientists report in a British study 65 
percent of the heroin seizures of 50 grams or more in British airports in the mid-1990s 
came from Nigeria (United Nations, 2005).  Particularly useful for analytical purposes are 
documents published by the State Department, many of them available on their 
website, most notably the annual reports published by its Bureau for International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 
 The present study makes use of all the above sources but at the same time 
remains aware of the serious limitations and problems with reliability and validity 
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official government documents often have. The study also makes use of the country and 
sector studies complied by consultants engaged by the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (United Nations, 2005).  These findings were presented and recorded in 
Dakar, Senegal, on April 2-3 April 2004.  The five country studies of the West African 
Region consisted of a standard questionnaire which consultants were required to 
answer, accompanied by country specific views on different issues concerning 
transnational crime.  In addition, papers presented by experts on diamond smuggling, 
drug smuggling, and arms trafficking provide a large part of the empirical data used for 
this study in conjunction with official documents found on transnational crime in other 
parts of the world.   
 It is relevant to note at this point the growing general opinion among 
criminologist and other academic specialists is transnational crime and organized crime 
are both a less clear cut object of inquiry than once seemed to be the case (Williams, 
2004).   In part, this is a reflection of the growing sophistication with which researchers 
have viewed the subject, suggesting that the closer one examines transnational crime 
the less organized it actually appears.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Origins of Transnational Crime in West Africa 
 Transnational crime in West Africa consists of criminal network enterprises 
collaborating and coming into contact due to mass immigration and the cultivation of 
newly independent states in which borders are transforming colonies into sovereign 
nations.  Transnational crime in West Africa is generally perceived to have emerged in 
the 1970s, in correspondence with the oil price rises of the decade, the de-linkage of the 
dollar from gold, high inflation, and the rapid spread of debt in the developing world 
with the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programs by The World Bank, intended 
to help stimulate the economy. Nevertheless, it would be naive to insist on this exact 
chronology as the Nigerian country consultant identifies the roots of the new patterns 
of crime existing slightly earlier (Alemika, 2004). Similar behavior is traced back decades 
earlier, to the ancient traditions of long distance commerce historically characteristic of 
the region.  There is also evidence of European criminal gangs who pioneered trans-
continental crime from bases in West Africa during colonial times.  In The Ivory Coast, 
even before independence in 1960, there were Corsican gangs specializing in cigarette 
smuggling as well as the recruitment of women for prostitution (Ellis, 1997).  When and 
where exactly transnational crime began in West Africa is then a rather difficult question 
to answer with great certainty. 
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It was not only the general economic climate of the 1970s that caused some 
people to turn to crime as a means of livelihood on a scale previously unseen, but also 
some of the institutional arrangements that were introduced to stimulate trade.  A 
Sierra Leonean police official, for example, connects the rise of transnational crime in his 
country to the creation of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 
1975, which facilitated movement between member States (Alemika, 2004).  While 
there had always been movements of people from place to place, the circumstances of 
civil wars occurring in the late 1970s stimulated some very large population migrations. 
Before the early 1980s the Nigerian economy was booming and immigrants from other 
parts of the Africa, most notably Ghanaians, were attracted to come here for financial 
opportunity. Ghanaians were among the first West Africans in modern times to migrate 
widely.  With the onset of major economic problems in the 1970s and benefiting from 
the country’s generally high standard of education, a large number of people who spoke 
English were able to compete in transnational labor markets.  This created a tradition of 
migration by young Ghanaian men in search of economic and social advancement but 
the down turn in the oil economy caused many such migrants to move on in search of 
new opportunities.   
After the end of the oil boom in Nigeria, in the early 1980s, Nigerians were 
impelled to spread throughout the region in search of economic opportunity. A Sierra 
Leone police officer notes, “It is now firmly held that transnational crime and the groups 
involved were first introduced into Sierra Leone by Nigerians” (Lengor, 2004). The Ivory 
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Coast offered a similar allure to Nigerians in the Anglophone world.  Transnational crime 
and the criminal groups involved are believed to have arrived in the early 1980s when 
the country attracted large numbers of Nigerian immigrants in search of work.  A 
problem of armed robbery emerged, as bands of immigrants formed that were later 
joined by Ivorians (Sissoko, 2004). In 1983, Nigeria officially expelled millions of 
Ghanaian migrants, “…in a bid to rid itself of unwanted guests” (Lenor, 2004; 5).  Most 
returned to Ghana, but a fair proportion of these promptly migrated once again to 
wherever they believed they might find work and as other foreign job markets became 
more difficult, many appear to have been attracted to illicit forms of enrichment (United 
Nations, 2005). In Ghana, transnational crime appears to emerge in the 1980s, 
connected with the problems and the opportunities offered by mass migration. Some 
politically controversial attempts to regulate immigration in the 1990s have become 
inextricably connected to the violence that has now emerged in the country, creating a 
mix of crime, politics, violence and debates on identity and migration (Aning, 2005).  
Moreover, wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone facilitate the import of firearms by armed 
groups, including armed robbers, to The Ivory Coast (Lengor, 2004).  A roughly similar 
development appears to have occurred in Senegal, where armed robbery, marijuana 
trading, and weapons trafficking is connected to the emergence of a low intensity 
armed conflict in the Casamance region since the early 1980s.  Indeed, it sometimes 
appears that the conflict in Casamance has lost almost any ideological or political 
content it may once have had, and has become a pretext for various forms of crime 
(Evans, 2003).  War then becomes a profitable and necessary means to maintain the 
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illegal markets.  Even the Senegalese armed forces are found to be involved in criminal 
activity such as abusing official procedures to buy and sell weapons illegally.  In 2003, for 
example, Spanish authorities seized weapons on a ship in Barcelona that had been 
loaded in the republic of Korea and was destined for Dakar.  It emerged that the 
weapons had been purchased by the Senegalese military without providing full 
information to civilian officials within the defense ministry (Vines, 2004). 
 One expert believes traces of transnational crime and criminal networks involved 
may be identified in Nigeria before the 1970’s in the form of crime groups involved in 
falsifying imports in order to transfer funds outside the country, normally in breach of 
currency regulations.  This process involved over-invoicing, or importing sub standard 
goods for delivery to governmental departments, in return for kickbacks paid to 
government officials. This may be regarded as a pioneering form of the widespread 
frauds that were to become a trademark of West African criminal networks in later 
years.  The same expert agrees with many other sources, however, that in general, the 
1980s was the decade that first witnessed the flourishing of transnational crime in 
Nigeria.  This is attributed to the general corruption of the civilian government of 1979 – 
1983; the introduction of a structural adjustment program in 1986 which resulted in 
greater poverty, unemployment, an increase in migration, the rapid and ill prepared 
liberalization of the financial sector, and the establishment of poorly regulated finance 
houses and banks which all provide new opportunities for money-laundering, fraud, and 
illegal foreign exchange transactions (Alemika, 2004). From the late 1980s transnational 
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advance fee fraud became a public issue in Nigeria for the first time, apparently 
developing from the prior existence of corrupt dealings in foreign exchange and the 
transfer of stolen funds through foreign businesses and entrepreneurs (United Nations, 
2005).  
Size of Transnational Crime Groups in West Africa 
Research for the present study did not reveal any statistical estimates 
concerning the overall size and value of organized crime in West Africa.  Even if such 
figures were published, they would need to be treated with great caution.  Crime figures 
are extremely hazardous in all countries because a large majority of crime goes 
undetected and can only be estimated on the basis of arrests and interceptions.  In the 
case of West Africa, statistics are more than usually hard to come by.  No police force in 
West Africa publishes comprehensive figures on crime seizures or arrests (Williams, 
2004).   Not only are there no reliable statistics, law enforcement agencies do not 
collaborate with researchers to investigate the sources, patterns, trends, and 
organizational structure of criminal groups throughout the region (Alemika 2004).  Some 
tentative observations of the number of people involved in transnational crime within 
the area can be made, however, on the basis of rather scarce statistics of drug seizures 
made in West Africa or of cargoes that have traveled across the region.    
The West African region does play a significant role in the transnational 
transport of drugs.  It is striking that, with the exception of marijuana, a relatively low-
value commodity, and some psychotropic substances that are manufactured locally, 
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illegal drugs that pass through West Africa are not produced in the region nor are their 
prime markets here.  In other words, West Africa has come to play a significant role as a 
point of transshipment for cargoes of heroin and cocaine that are produced in South 
Asia and South America and are destined for markets in Europe or North America.  The 
Ivory Coast appears to be a major transit point for heroin en route to Europe, and Ghana 
for cocaine headed for the same destination, although why there is such a specialization 
between these two countries is unclear (Quist, 2004).  While the organizers of these 
narcotics trades are of diverse ethnicities, a considerable number of them are indeed 
African.  Much of the cocaine passing through Ghana and other countries of the region 
appears previously to have traveled through Nigeria (United Nations, 2005). 
 In the mid 1980s, the United States authorities estimated that Nigerians made 58 
percent of fraudulent insurance claims in their country, and that Nigerian fraudsters 
were responsible for some $20-26 billion worth of fraud each year in the United States 
alone (United Nations, 2005).  Notorious Nigerian advance-fee frauds known as “419” 
letters are estimated to be worth several hundred million US dollars a year (Olukoya, 
2002).  British police in 1997 received from members of the public 68,000 reports of 
“419” letters sent by Nigerian gangs, with very many more being circulated but never 
made known to police (Elliott, 1998). Occasional figures like these suggest little more 
than fraud of various types is indeed carried out by West Africans internationally and on 
a substantial scale.  Some individual cases can certainly involve huge amounts of money 
as indicated by the arrest of Emmanuel Nwude and others who were involved in an 
advance fee fraud of no less than $240-245 million US Dollars (Alemika, 2004). 
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 While drug smuggling and advance fee frauds perpetrated by West Africans are 
among the types of activity that generate the most concern internationally, evidence 
suggests that certain other major fields of criminal activity recorded in the region 
receive little attention despite (or because of) their clear political importance (Williams, 
2004).  In regard to “oil bunkering” in Nigeria, for example, the smuggling of crude oil is 
estimated to account for as much as 35 percent of the country’s oil exports, although 
estimates vary widely.  Senior Nigerian government sources have themselves stated that 
as many as 30,000 barrels of oil may be exported from the country illegally everyday, 
although this figure is regarded by officials to be very low (Alemika, 2004).  In any event, 
it implies the occurrence of illegal oil exports amounting to over a billion US dollars 
annually and perhaps three or four times that figure occur within Nigeria alone (United 
Nations, 2005).  
Structure 
Free trade laws and the presence of technology facilitating mass communication 
allows organized crime groups to fashion themselves like that of any other business 
enterprise.  Collaboration between groups has allowed businesses to stretch across 
national boundaries giving rise to the new phenomena of transnational crime.  Unlike 
large corporations, however, of hierarchal structure, organized crime groups thrive and 
multiply through the use of a complex and fragmented networking apparatus.  The 
bureaucratic structure of a large corporation would make crime groups more vulnerable 
to law enforcement detection.  Therefore, instead of crime groups looking to compete 
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with one another, individuals of different groups with different connections make new 
connections and/or terminate old business ties to expedite the manufacture, 
transportation, and/or distribution profitability and limit the risk of detection by law 
enforcement.  The investment of money made through the illicit market is even done 
with the collaboration of those investors involved in the legit economy (United Nations, 
2005).  
 In attempt to describe the structure of criminal groups in West Africa the 
business enterprise paradigm becomes the most helpful when trying to make sense of 
what would otherwise be, a tangled web of permanent, semi-permanent, and 
temporary networks.  By utilizing a social network in which individuals work together, 
irregularly and on a need to know basis, individuals are able to interact just enough to 
carry out business exchanges and transactions at the transnational level.  The 
hierarchical, corporation like model is hardly known or even relevant in this region of 
the world.  Groups tend to organize themselves more so in project based type 
relationships. Whoever becomes useful or has the necessary resources to get a job done 
is who becomes involved in the functioning of an enterprise at one point or another.  
Criminal enterprises in West Africa use similar techniques to involve legitimate traders 
and businesses typically in societies sharing a common ancestry.  The standard 
procedure is as follows,  
“…an individual entrepreneur who succeeds in making money in a particular 
field, as the volume of business grows, will invite one or more junior relatives or 
other dependents to join him or her in the business.    These newcomers 
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effectively become apprentices to the original entrepreneur.  If further 
manpower is required, other personnel may be recruited for a specific task, but 
not other wise retained for permanent employment” (Forrest, 1994; 27). 
 One of the consequences of this mode of operation is that it tends to form very 
close ties between different families, ethnicities, and between illicit and legitimate 
business personnel.  First the enterprises usually involve master entrepreneurs and their 
apprentices who are training to become traders or suppliers in specific goods and 
services.  Second, there is cooperation among the enterprises/entrepreneurs, such that 
if goods are not available in a given area or shop then they are collected and supplied 
from another entrepreneur.  Third, many of the entrepreneurs have relationships or 
acquaintances, which facilitate payment for the imported goods for commission 
(Alemika, 2004).  In other words, major drug traffickers, for example, may employ 
others on a one-time basis to perform certain tasks, such as making a delivery, or driving 
a car to a given point, or physically carrying illicit goods from one country to another 
filling the role of the “mule” or courier.   
It should be noted that this casual impromptu approach to criminal activity 
makes detection extremely difficult since groups do not necessarily contain a set 
amount of actors or individuals that carry out the enterprise.  Police services from 
various parts of the world report the interrogation of an intercepted drug courier from 
West Africa often reveals very little about the individuals who have employed the 
courier to carry the drugs across national borders.  Typically couriers are employed for 
only several hundred dollars and are only given information on a need to know basis 
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and typically know very little about whom they are working for or even who is receiving 
the smuggled goods.  They are often hired by a person using a pseudonym, and given 
instructions to deliver a package to a certain address, or to await a call, with no further 
information (Williams, 2004). Hiring personnel for specific projects only, rather than 
hiring them on a permanent basis makes it very difficult for law enforcement officials to 
gather any helpful information from individuals placed under arrest for involvement in 
such illegal behavior.   
This project-based mode of networking, often associated with patterns of 
recruitment based on kinship, has proved itself highly adaptable to transnational 
commerce in profitable illicit markets.  For example, a gang was broken up in January 
2004 after Sierra Leone police had arrested a Nigerian at Lungi International Airport in 
possession of 4.2 kilograms of cocaine. The culprit was one of a network of Nigerians, 
who lived in Freetown and ran a shop selling spare parts for cars.  His role was to receive 
couriers arriving at Lungi airport, arrange accommodations for them, and dispatch 
couriers bound for Europe with drugs collected in Freetown.  A Nigerian woman living in 
Lagos, a city in southwestern Nigeria would then smuggle the drug cargoes into Sierra 
Leone for distribution (Lengor, 2004).  Relationships of this sort enable successful drug 
smuggling groups to become “vertically integrated” having associates at every stage of 
the trading chain from buying at the source, to the point of retail sale.  Every stage in 
between is handled by members of the same network maximizing profits and enabling 
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groups to coexist with other competitors such as Columbian criminal groups that deal 
with much larger quantities of cocaine (Williams, 2004).   
 Computer crime, which typically involves the use of the Internet and email for 
various types of fraud, generates its own forms of organization.  Most obviously, this 
activity requires a relatively high standard of education in the sense that people 
involved need to be skilled at working with computers and does not necessarily need 
accomplices to successfully pursue their activities.  A Ghanaian analyst notes two modes 
of operation that are typical of computer fraud.  In the more hierarchal of the two, an 
experienced operator provides the initial resources to a small number of apprentices, 
including access to the Internet.  In the second mode, an individual operator sends out 
his or her own “419” messages to potential victims.  A “419” message or letter is an 
advance fee fraud scam involving a confidence trick in which the target is persuaded to 
advance relatively small sums of money in the hope of realizing a much larger gain. If 
the operator succeeds in attracting a response, he then engages other partners for this 
particular scheme, taking the lead role for the duration of the scam only to return to 
solitary work (Williams, 2004). 
 Ghanaian blacksmiths able to produce firearms using the artisan tools and 
materials at their disposal also work with a small number of people. Research indicates 
that illegal firearm manufacturing is organized by guilds whose basic structure is of 
some 10 -15 members, and sometimes as many as 50 members in cases where 
production has grown to include other goods.  As in any major production process, 
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there are internal hierarchal distinctions, based on leadership, experience, levels of 
training, and trust.  Hence, many individuals involved may only be aware of one part of 
the process, which involve such aspects as where to purchase raw materials, marketing, 
and contacts within law enforcement.  Normally, such specialized skills are handed 
down from father to son within families (United Nations, 2005).  
 Ultimately, with some exceptions and depending on the type of enterprise, 
criminal groups in West Africa tend to structure themselves in a less strict hierarchal 
organized fashion to co exists with larger competitive groups.  There are very few 
examples of hierarchal groups with long-term associations.  Far more common are the 
project-based operations, in which a criminal entrepreneur and two or three 
apprentices hire others for specific purposes, and for a short duration, using a 
traditional method of organizing a business.  Recruitment also takes place through 
channels of kinship or other association.  There is also a high degree of activity by 
individuals who act alone as well, such as people who try their chance at drug 
smuggling. West African criminal networks, however, are at the forefront of 
transnational developments, as academic criminologists and law enforcement officials 
are currently emphasizing the importance of networks rather than the idea of strict 
mafia style organizations (Williams, Arquilla, Ronfeldt, 2001).  The criminal networks of 
West Africa are adapting and adjusting quite successfully to the global capitalist age of 
transnational business and exchange.  
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The Role of Ethnicity & Social Relationships  
 The practice of recruiting through networks of kinship, typically based on villages 
or other region of origin, means that the endeavors of criminal networks are facilitated 
by cultural codes known to the perpetrators, but more or less impenetrable to 
outsiders, including law enforcement officers.  Relevant examples of this include the 
practice of administering oaths sworn by reference to religious oracles, and the use of 
local languages or dialects that make infiltration by outsiders extremely difficult.  
Western police officers often point out that it is virtually impossible for them to 
infiltrate a West African criminal network personally for rather obvious reasons, and 
that it is almost as difficult to find translators who can decipher taped phone 
conversations in some parts of West Africa, including south eastern Nigeria, noted for 
the entrepreneurial talents of its people, local dialects differ greatly even in small areas 
(United Nations, 2005).   
 The effect of recruitment through personal networks creates an association 
between certain trades and specific places.  Nigerian networks of prostitution, for 
example, are frequently associated with Edo State and with Benin City because those 
that pioneered the trade have kept it in the hands of networks of kin and associates, 
thus excluding outsiders.  This inadvertently creates the impression to outsiders that 
particular ethnic groups dominate certain branches of commerce, whether legitimate or 
illicit.  For example, a Nigerian law enforcement officer noted that drug trafficking 
networks appear to be dominated by lgbo-speaking people from southeast Nigeria and 
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Yoruba and by southern minority groups.  Such may also be deduced from the names of 
people arrested and tried in both Nigeria and abroad, from records of the Nigerian Drug 
Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and from newspaper articles (Alemika, 2004).  An 
officer of the Sierra Leone police remarks that the lgbos and Yoruba from Nigeria 
dominate the drug trade in his country (Lengor, 2004).  He attributes this partly to the 
migration of considerable numbers lgbos during the Biafra war of the 1960s, as well to 
an older tradition of Yoruba migration.  The establishment of Diasporas from these 
groups has facilitated their creation of transnational networks in more recent times 
(Alemika, 2004).  
Transnational Criminal Enterprises in West Africa 
 After understanding how criminal groups generally tend to operate in this region 
of the world it is important to know what types of criminal enterprises crime groups are 
involved in.  In this section the known nature, extent, and diversity of the activities of 
organized criminal groups in West Africa are discussed and presented.  This is done to 
provide some indication as to the complexity of illegal activity in the region.    The 
specific areas mentioned below were selected by the UNODC as the most important.  
The two areas that create the most concern internationally are the trafficking of drugs 
and serious fraud carried out by West Africans, either in their own region of origin or 
outside of it (Williams, 2004). 
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Drug trafficking 
Cases of drug trafficking exist in West Africa as far back as the 1930s but the 
region’s emerging role as a transit point for global movements of narcotics can be said 
to have become a serious problem only in the early 1980s. Police forces in Ghana and 
Sierra Leone both allege that largely Nigerian criminals seeking new operating locations 
introduced drug trafficking to their countries (United Nations, 2005).  In seizure reports 
gathered by the UNODC over the period 2000-2004, more than 1.4 tons of cocaine were 
seized en route to West Africa or from West Africa to Europe, not including two 
unusually large seizures of 2.29 and 7.5 tons (Quist, 2004).  There is also an import and 
re-export trade in heroin from South Asia.  The key entry points for heroin are Ethiopia 
and Kenya, with Egypt to a lesser extent.  A courier then transports the drug cargoes 
from East to West Africa, almost entirely by air courier, The Ivory Coast forming the Hub 
of the trade in West Africa.  However, since the outbreak of war in The Ivory Coast in 
2002, there may have been a decline in heroin trafficking through the country, with a 
corresponding rise in neighboring countries (Williams, 2004).   
There still remains other evidence to support the view that the drug trade 
remains a Nigerian specialty.  According to West African statistics compiled since 2000, 
92 percent of couriers intercepted with drugs transmitting through West Africa were 
West Africans and no less than 56 percent were Nigerian (Quist, 2004).  Law 
enforcement agencies in a wide variety of countries including the Netherlands, South 
Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States, all report the regular interception of 
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Nigerian drug couriers, and their police intelligence services believe that some Nigerian 
networks have developed a very considerable share in the global narcotics market.  
United States law enforcement officers have described how Nigerian networks may 
collaborate with significant Columbian, Mexican, and Italian groups, in effect receiving 
subcontracts from these major operators who have tended traditionally to operate in 
more hierarchal structures than Nigerians (Ellis, 2004).   No comprehensive figures for 
drug related arrests are available, but the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 
(NDLEA) reported the following numbers of arrests for the period 1994 – 2003: 
cannabis, 18,775; cocaine, 559; heroin, 598; pharmaceutical psychotropic drugs, 799 
(Alemika, 2004). 
 Several West African countries are used as a base by networks of drug 
traffickers with international connections.  Very large shipments via West Africa tend to 
be controlled by non-Africans having one or more local accomplices.  In addition, there 
are significant numbers of West Africans who may attempt to smuggle narcotics from 
Latin America or South Asia to Europe or North America in smaller quantities, not more 
than a few kilograms, either directly or through West Africa.  Typical cases would 
include, for example, the 26-year-old Nigerian woman who had obtained 815 grams of 
heroin in Pakistan and flew from Karachi via Dubai and Libreville before being arrested 
at Cotonou airport in Benin on 30 December 2003 as she left an Air Gabon flight.  
Another case was the 28 year old Nigerian man arrested on July 25th 2003 at Addis 
Ababa airport, Ethiopia, en route from Karachi to Abidijan, having swallowed no less 
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than 1.266 kilograms of heroin (United Nations, 2005).  The Ivory Coast has established 
itself as a major transit point for heroin, although it may be in decline since the outbreak 
of war in 2002.  Figures compiled by the UNODC since January 2000 indicate 22 cases of 
couriers bound for Abidjan, the largest city in The Ivory Coast, being intercepted in four 
years.  In at least 14 of these cases, one or more of those arrested was Nigerian.  Most 
were carrying heroin obtained in Pakistan, although one interception made at Abidjan 
airport on July 9th, 2002 was of a Guinean and a Nigerian male traveling together, who 
had transported 3.19 kilograms of cocaine from Curacao via Amsterdam, some of it in 
their luggage, and some swallowed (United Nations, 2005).   
Although the press often makes reference to “drug barons” and “drug mafias”, 
there is actually no evidence for the existence of West African drug cartels in the sense 
of hierarchal, rather permanent, corporation-like structures. Evidence suggests that 
participants typically start out with small scale legit enterprises. For example, individuals 
who try their luck as couriers or traders in legitimate goods may diversify into the illegal 
sector in the attempt to make extra money.  In the early 1980s, for example, it was 
reported that Nigerian students in the United States often doubled as small-scale 
couriers, perhaps because of the difficulties in receiving scholarship allowances at the 
time (Alemika, 2004).  Those that succeed may recruit couriers, usually on a one-time 
basis, and join the league of larger operators through a series of networking enabling 
them to expand market accessibility and profits. 
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Advance – fee and Internet Fraud 
 Advance-fee fraud with the use of the Internet appears to be a field in which 
Nigerian entrepreneurs pioneered and remain prominent. According to one of 
Nigerian’s leading financial regulators, at an Interpol meeting in 2003, 122 out of 138 
countries represented complained about Nigerian financial fraud in their countries 
(Alemika, 2004).  Although fraud can take many forms, including for example false 
insurance claims, the most common type is the advance-fee fraud known as “419”, 
named after the section of the Nigerian criminal code prohibiting the practice.  They are 
by definition attempts to obtain pre payment for goods or services that do not actually 
intend to deliver.  The “419” frauds in the form of paper mail are letters that contain 
official looking stationary with appropriate government seals, stamps, and signatures.  
The quality of the letters has evolved over the years, from poorly handwritten letters to 
more professional products prepared on word processors.  Advance fee fraud criminals 
include sophisticated professionals who are experts in contract fraud, the conversion of 
hard currency, the sale of crude oil below market prices, the purchase of real estate, the 
disbursement of money from wills, threat scams, and extortion (Corsun, 1998).   One 
key features of typical of “419” frauds of this type is that the instigator proposes a 
service that is clearly illegal, such as the laundering of illicitly acquired funds through the 
target’s bank account (Williams, 2003).  For this reason, Western police tended to have 
little sympathy for victims of these scams and did very little, at first, to gather 
information to identify the culprits.  However, in recent years some police forces have 
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begun to take such crime more seriously, not only on account of their apparent size, but 
also because of the realization that perpetrators of advance-fee frauds may also be 
involved in other forms of crime, such as drug smuggling, which police forces do take 
seriously (Ellis, 2003).   
 Very little startup capital is required for someone to operate a “419” scam.  All 
that is required are the names and addresses of prospective victims, and access to 
electronic communications such as a telephone, a fax, or e-mail and internet facilities.  
Today, these are easily acquired in public internet cafes or business services bureaus   
One person can pose as the relative of a known figure, such as a former head of state or 
minister, claiming that their late husband or parent has left behind a fabulous sum of 
money that requires laundering in collaboration with a foreign partner, in return for a 
percentage of the sum (Sissoko, 2004; pg. 25).  Frauds of this type have increased in The 
Ivory Coast since 2000 involving the Nigerians as well (Sissoko, 2004). In one such case, a 
Nigerian fraud gang working in The Ivory Coast succeeded in cheating an Iranian 
businessman out of $80,000 US dollars (United Nations, 2005).   In the United States the 
Internet Fraud Complaint Center, which receives information on Internet crime, 
calculates in its 2001 Internet Fraud Report that Nigerian letter fraud cases amount to 
some 15.5 percent of all complaints.  The consultant who reports this statistic notes that 
“while the median loss in all manner of Internet fraud was $435 US dollars, in Nigerian 
scams it was significantly higher at $5, 575 US dollars (Williams, 2004).  In this report for 
2002, the same organization noted that of some 16,000 complaints regarding Nigerian 
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fraud communications, 74 people had lost between them some $1.6 million US dollars 
(United Nations, 2005).   
 The anonymity and impermanence of email communications makes it hard for 
police forces to apprehend “419” fraudsters, but there is some information about them 
that is fairly well established.  Most obviously, “419” operators must be educated 
enough to perform email transactions that are untraceable, and have sufficient 
knowledge of international government and business practices in order to trap the 
greedy and the gullible.  Internet fraudsters have been known to work with lawyers, 
accountants, and even members of security agencies whom they may pay for their 
services.  One of the most notorious cases involved several people and netted $240 – 
245 million US dollars. Dr. Ukeh made initial contact with the victim, who was selected 
due to his connections with others he was able to bring into the scheme.  These 
connections included one Emmanuel Nwude, an aspiring politician and owner of 
properties in Lagos, Enugu, and London, who emerged as the main organizer of the 
fraud which also included a couple, Ikechukwu and Amaka Anajemba, and a politician, 
Maurice Ibekwe.  Emmanuel Nwude, the suspected ring leader and ex member of the 
board of Union Bank, one of the biggest financial establishments in Nigeria, remains as 
one of the major shareholders in the bank today.  He is also a leading shareholder in a 
leading construction company G. Cappa.  At the time of his arrest Nwude owned houses 
in London, Lagos, and Enugu, as well as close to a dozen luxury cars.  Nwude an his 
accomplices are alleged to have persuaded a Brazilian banker, the head of transnational 
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finance at Banco Nordeste in Sao Paolo, to send them money for what they said was the 
construction of a new airport at Abujua.  The Brazilian had first met the men while he 
was on a visit to Nigeria in 1994.  By mid-2001, he had transferred over $240 million US 
dollars to fund construction of a non-existent airport.  He, in fact, took the funds illegally 
from his on bank, in several transfers.  The Nigerian fraudsters persuaded him he was 
dealing with leading officials of the Nigerian State.  As various times, one of the gang 
members pretended to be the governor of the Nigerian Central Bank in dealing with the 
Brazilian while another posed as his deputy (Alemika, 2004). Certain fraud projects, such 
as this one, may require extra personnel, especially if people are required to act the role 
of a government official, a banker, an official driver, etc.  All of the people involved are 
typically engaged for a particular task often without being informed of the larger 
scheme in which they are participating (United Nations, 2005).   
 Human Trafficking 
 Human trafficking in the region takes place in a variety of ways.  One form is that 
of agricultural slavery.  In the Ivory Coast, it is reported that some of the immigrants 
from Burkina Faso who work on cocoa plantations in the west of the country are 
actually slaves (Sissoko, 2004). Cases of imported slave labor reports from Sierra Leone 
describe how Lebanese or Indian businessmen traffic Indians (Lengor, 2004).  The 
traditional system in West Africa, whereby an adult may place a child or other young 
dependent with a distant part of an extended family as an apprentice can also be 
exploited for monetary gain (Williams, 2004).  In Ghana, the internal trafficking of 
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children is one of the biggest challenges.  Many Ghanaian children are trafficked from 
their home villages to work in the fishing industry.  The depletion of stocks is one of the 
key reasons children are needed to work in this industry.  They represent cheap labor 
and are often used to dive and untangle fishnets (Johansen, 2006).  Again the tradition 
of parents sending their children to work as apprentices is what makes this crime so 
prevalent and so severely underreported. 
 West Africa is also a transit point for people seeking to avoid international 
controls on migration.  In 2003, a Nigerian citizen was arrested in Sierra Leone in the 
company of six Chinese nationals whom he was helping to travel to the United Kingdom.  
The organizer was working in partnership with a Chinese entrepreneur based in Nigeria 
(United Nations, 2005). Both Nigerian and other international groups are said to use 
Sierra Leone as a place of transit for labor migrants under the guise of refugees (Lengor, 
2004).   
 Human trafficking is also done for the purposes of prostitution or sex slavery.  In 
Sierra Leone, it is reported that members of the country’s influential Lebanese 
community have taken local girls to Lebanon, mostly under 18 years of age, supposedly 
to work as maids. These same girls, however, are allegedly put into the prostitution 
business in Lebanon.  The traffickers pay money to the girls’ families to divert attention 
away from their children (United Nations, 2005).  There was a noticeable increase of 
human trafficking of various types in Sierra Leone during the war of 1991 – 2002, as 
young people went abroad to Libya, Burkina Faso, and The Ivory Coast all located in the 
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region of West Africa.  Men went to be trained as fighters, often lured with false 
promises of education or employment.  Women were forced to work for armed 
movements as forced laborers or sex slaves.  Throughout the armed conflict in Sierra 
Leone that lasted from 1991 – 2002 thousands of women and girls were abducted by 
the rebels and subjected to sexual slavery in which they were forced to become sex 
slaves for their rebel “husbands”.  The main perpetrators of sexual violence, including 
sexual slavery were the rebel forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed 
Force Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and the West Side Boys, a splinter group of the 
AFRC.  To date there has been no accountability of the thousands of crimes of sexual 
violence or other appalling human rights abuses committed during the war (Cornell, 
2007).   
 A particularly flourishing trade in prostitutes exists in Nigeria.  Many of the 
women or young girls involved are from Edo state, and the main destinations are Europe 
– especially Italy – and the Middle East (Alemika, 2004).  Nigeria’s international trade in 
prostitutes is believed by analyst to have grown in the 1990s as prospects for 
employment in Nigeria deteriorated.  The organizers of the trade are often women who 
are former prostitutes that succeeded in making money and graduate to the status of 
madams.  These madams, however, still depend on men for travel documents and to 
escort the girls to their destinations.  A successful madam must attend to all aspects of 
her business.  She must organize the recruitment of prostitutes in West Africa, often on 
the pretext that they will find jobs in agriculture or the hotel business in Europe, but 
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must also provide false or forged travel documents for the girls.  She will need to bribe 
immigration officials, both in Nigeria and in transit countries; she will need to have a 
network of operators in hotels or hostels; she will need to be in touch with fetish 
priests, who administer an oath of secrecy on prospective prostitutes, and with lawyers 
who can draft agreements binding a prostitute to a madam.  Typically, a madam may 
claim to have invested $40-50,000 US dollars for the costs of travel to Europe, the 
prostitute is then required to repay (Williams, 2004).  The large numbers of people 
deported from Italy and other European Union countries in recent years suggests that 
this is a flourishing field.  Press reports indicate 1,116 people are deported for the 
trafficking of prostitutes in 2001 alone, the majority from Italy, with others coming from 
the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, and Belgium (Alemika, 2004).   
Diamond Smuggling 
 The smuggling of diamonds has become something of a specialty in parts of 
West Africa. This is due largely to the occurrence of high quality alluvial diamonds in 
Sierra Leone that can be mined with no more equipment than a spade and a sieve.  
Deficiencies in government permits the smuggling and other evasions of official 
regulations on a massive scale.  The most profitable part of the diamond trade is not the 
extraction of the stones, but their export to wholesale and cutting centers overseas, 
most notably in Belgium. Foreigners dominate the export business, especially Lebanese 
and Syrians (many of which have been established in West Africa for generations) and to 
a lesser extent, Israelis (United Nations, 2005).  
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 The mining and export of diamonds overlaps with crime groups in at least three 
aspects.  First rebel groups use diamonds to finance their war effort.  While the most 
notorious example is the RUF in Sierra Leone, the same has been done by the Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in Liberia and by groups within the 
Ivory Coast.  It is reported that there is a connection between Al-Qaeda and the illicit 
diamond trade in West Africa.  Agents of Al-Qaeda allegedly systematically bought 
diamonds from Sierra Leone as a way of laundering money, and there is substantial 
evidence that diamonds may be used for financing a variety of political or guerilla 
movements in the Middle East (Farah, 2001& 2004).  In the 1980s, the leading diamond 
dealer in Sierra Leone, Jamil Said Mohammed, developed considerable influence in 
Lebanon, which was at the time in the state of civil war, through his Lebanese 
connections in the Islamic Republic of Iran.  Sierra Leone diamonds were undoubtedly a 
significant source of financing the Lebanese civil war (Ellis, 1988).  Secondly, diamonds 
are smuggled even from areas that are not prone to conflict.  Statistics covering the 
diamond trade are full of discrepancies suggesting that, particularly during the war of 
the 1990s, diamonds mined in Sierra Leone could be smuggled to neighboring countries 
before being sent onto Belgium, so that Belgian import figures often bear little relation 
to the export statistics of other countries.  This illegal trade is not new, with one study 
being completed in the 1950s judging the smuggling of diamonds from Sierra Leone to 
be “the greatest smuggling operation in the world” (Fleming, 1960).  In short, the 
existence of a huge, barely regulated diamond sector in Sierra Leone increases the 
likelihood many countries and networks in the region function illegally especially since 
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the unofficial diamond trade is deeply rooted in tradition, having existed for over half a 
century within this area (Williams, 2004).  Third and finally, organized crime groups may 
engage in the illicit diamond trade partly to cover illicit activities elsewhere, in other 
words as a form of money laundering.  When Sierra Leone’s economy declined in the 
1980s, a shortage of foreign exchange through formal sources – banks – meant that 
Lebanese diamond traders were able to provide foreign exchange which they acquired 
through diamond sales.  Some also obtained import businesses so to complete an 
import – export cycle.  Some experts in West Africa believe that some diamond 
companies use diamonds to settle accounts in a form of “Hawala”, or an informal value 
transfer system, so as to minimize the necessity to use banks or other conventional 
financial mechanisms that would expose them to tax obligations.  Some diamond 
merchants who are prominent in West Africa also have diamond interests elsewhere, 
notably in Central Africa, suggesting the existence of very complex movements of goods 
and diamonds covering several different countries (Dietrich, 2004).   
 Cigarette Smuggling 
 The smuggling of cigarettes is recorded in several countries of the region, 
including Sierra Leone, where the existence of a higher rate of excise tax on cigarettes 
than in the neighboring republic of Guinea provides an incentive to smuggle cigarettes.  
Although the trade is not inherently violent, it flourished in the conditions of the late 
1990s civil war and has been recorded to occur between The Ivory Coast and Ghana 
(Williams, 2004). 
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 An example of a cigarette smuggling group is the Wansa group, operating from 
Sierra Leone.  The head is a Fula businessman known as “Guinea Wansa”.  Regarded as 
the head of the syndicate, he operates from Sierra Leone but has close links with an 
official trader in Guinea, who imports cigarettes from abroad.  Having been brought into 
Guinea by legal means, the cigarettes are exported under the cover of darkness in local 
boats known as pampas, avoiding custom controls.  In Sierra Leone, Wansa has a team 
of four major distributors strategically located in Freetown, Bo, and Kenema.  The 
cigarettes are moved between these two locations by truck, generally covered by 
legitimate merchandise to disguise them.  Membership of the organization is secretive 
and is dependent on kinship and ethnic bonds.  It is notable that members of this group 
in many ways do not display some of the characteristics commonly associated with 
professional criminals.  They are pious and other wise law abiding Muslims, who respect 
the authority of Islamic religious authorities, such that any dispute between them is 
generally settled by established social authorities rather than by the resort to violence 
(Lengor, 2004).  Those most highly specializing in cigarette smuggling are believed to 
have begun as traders in legitimate goods but have branched out into cigarette business 
as a means of investing capital earned elsewhere.  It is most common for Fulas, who are 
typically minorities in any country they live in, to smuggle small quantities at a time, 
often no more than 20 cartons.  One of the consequences of is, as a Sierra Leonean 
police officer notes, that money gained from the illegal smuggling of cigarettes is 
protected and covered by the genuine general merchandise business they operate 
between Guinea and Sierra Leone (United Nations, 2005). This makes it incredibly 
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difficult to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate profits in their overall 
turnover. 
 Money Laundering 
 Some of the world’s largest banks are known to have been complicit in such 
schemes, including the notorious Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), 
which had more branches in Africa than in any other continent, as well as some private 
banking operations (Kerry and Brown, 1992).  Experienced eyewitnesses of [Nigerian 
banks] consider that money laundering was greatly facilitated, at a time when the drug 
trade in particular was in rapid expansion, by the growth of unlicensed financed houses, 
especially in the period of 1988-1991.  Other businesses regarded as particularly suitable 
for money laundering include second hand car dealing and fashionable clothes 
boutiques favored by female entrepreneurs (Alemika, 2004).  Throughout West Africa, 
almost all car purchases are of second-hand vehicles, often with few or no documents 
attached.  This clearly offers possibilities for money laundering through the motor trade.  
The diamond trade is also widely regarded as a particularly suitable medium for money 
laundering as was mentioned in the previous section.  A report issued in March 2004 by 
the United States State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs lists several countries as “vulnerable” to money laundering via the 
diamond trade, including Liberia and Sierra Leone (Facets, 2004).   
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Arms Manufacturing  
 Several countries in the region, but especially Ghana, have a flourishing arsenal 
industry of arms manufacture.  Such arsenal manufacture in Ghana is increasingly 
transnational, as arms are smuggled outside Ghana for use in violent crime (United 
Nations, 2005).  Iron-working technology has been known in West Africa for many 
centuries, but the manufacture of guns was made a criminal offence during colonial 
rule.  However, local smiths have not lost the skill of making guns, and recent research 
indicates that local processes have become increasingly sophisticated.  In one seizure of 
illegal weapons in Nigeria in April 2004, the goods confiscated included not only foreign 
made guns and ammunition, but also a locally assembled AK-47 assault riffle as well as 
13 locally made revolvers, four double barreled shotguns, one single barreled shotgun, 
and other pieces as well.  The police arrested 19 illegal manufacturers (P.M. News, 
Lagos, 2004).  In Ghana there have also been manufacturers able to produce pistols, 
shot guns, revolvers, and even in one case an AK-47 (Aning, 2004).   
 Ghana, in fact, appears to be the region’s most sophisticated capacity for 
manufacturing firearms.  According to research carried out by a leading Ghanaian 
academic, all 10 regions of the country have a manufacturing capacity, concentrated in 
small workshops that are able to produce 200 or more guns per year.  Middlemen 
export these to other parts of West Africa, including The Ivory Coast, Togo, and Nigeria 
(Aning, 2004).  Within Ghana, guns are sometimes used in cases of land conflicts 
between leaders of the people within a tribe or for certain ethnicity disputes (Williams, 
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2004).  A study of 5 of Ghana’s 10 regions identified no less than 70 towns in which a 
manufacturing capacity existed, with some 2,500 manufacturers in Brong-Ahafo region 
alone, suggesting a total production of 40-60,000 guns annually (Aning, 2004).  On April 
1st 2004, Nigerian police arrested a man coming from Benin with 16 firearms purchases 
in Accra, Ghana.  His intention had been to sell them in the market at Onitsha, the 
largest market in West Africa.  The police considered they were definitely destined for 
criminal use in Nigeria (Vanguard, 2004).  Furthermore, similar reports of arsenal 
weapons manufacturing have been received from Senegal, Guinea, Benin, Togo, Mali, 
and Nigeria, although in none of these cases has the subject of arms manufacturing 
been so extensively researched as it has been in Ghana (Vines, 2004). 
 Arms Trafficking 
 It is common cause that West Africa contains large quantities of illicit small arms, 
although the estimates given – the figure of seven million is sometimes encountered – 
appear often to be exaggerated.  The Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) ordered a freeze, or a delay, on imports in October 1998, with a condition 
that Member States wishing to import weapons must notify ECOWS of their intention to 
secure exemption from the moratorium.  However, freeze on the importation, 
exportation and manufacture of small arms and light weapons in West Africa has not 
worked well.  The Ivory Coast, Liberia, Burkina Faso, and Guinea have all violated it 
supplying non-State actors with freshly imported weapons and ammunition while at the 
same time, violating the United Nations arms embargoes, or trade restrictions, on Sierra 
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Leone and Liberia (Vines, 2004).  In 2002 and 2003, for example, The Ivory Coast 
allegedly received several deliveries of military equipment by air that went unreported 
to the ECOWAS.  For Liberia the figures for the same two years were 49 and 25 
deliveries respectively (Williams, 2003).  One international broker based in West Africa, 
who has organized several deliveries of weapons by air and sea told a UNODC 
consultant that he had never heard of the ECOWAS Moratorium (Vines, 2004). 
 In addition to the import and distribution of light weapons by governments, 
there is also an unregulated non-State trade.  Virtually every country in this region has a 
problem in this regard while The Ivory Coast and Nigeria probably are the largest 
importers at present.  Nigeria causes particular concern because of the fierce armed 
conflicts in the Niger Delta Region – which is already in the “high intensity conflict” 
category with over 1,000 fatalities a year.  The availability of weapons interacts with 
illegal oil bunkering, widespread corruption, high youth unemployment, and social 
disintegration to produce a highly dangerous mix (Vines, 2004).  In Senegal too, the 
existence of low level, armed conflict in the Casamance region has contributed to the 
illicit circulation of light weapons.  Insurgent forces in Casamance are known to have 
imported weapons from Guinea and Guinea-Bissau.  Light weapons are traded illegally 
and with only ineffective attempts at regulation by the police in the town of Touba, 
regarded as the holy city by members of the Mouride Islamic brotherhood.  There are 
some other locations in Senegal too that are known as centers of illegal weapons trade 
(United Nations, 2005).  
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Oil Bunkering 
“Oil bunkering” is a specialty of Nigeria, and for a long time the region’s only oil 
producer (Vines, 2004).  “Bunkering” is the process of filling a ship with oil, which is 
increasingly done illegally.  According to the Nigerian Federal government, some 
300,000 barrels are illegally exported per day.  Although oil bunkering on this scale 
requires sophisticated organization, and the complicity of state officials up to a very high 
level, it also flourishes amid the poverty and a sense of injustice in the Niger Delta area.  
People in many communities feel that they derive no benefit from the oil trade, and 
may therefore collaborate with criminal networks in the illegal export of oil (Williams, 
2004). The Niger Delta provides illicit networks with unemployed youth and armed 
ethnic militias who know the terrain well.  They also face a corrupt or ineffective law 
enforcement efforts and a weak judicial process.  These criminal networks also enjoy 
support from senior government officials and politicians, who use bunkering as a source 
for political campaigning (Vines, 2004).   
The oil bunkering syndicates are highly international, including not only other 
West Africans, but also Moroccans, Venezuelans, Lebanese, French, and Russians.  By 
these means, oil-bunkering links to wider patterns of organized crime, with cash, drugs, 
and weapons, all being traded in exchange for illegal oil.  A typical oil bunkering case 
was reported in a Nigerian newspaper on April 22nd 2004, reporting the arrest by the 
Nigerian navy of a ship loaded with 8,000 metric tons of crude oil without valid papers.  
Its crew of eight foreigners where also arrested (United Nations, 2005).  Such cases 
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reveal the possible extent of the problem.  However, relatively little is known as to the 
nature and over all extent of the problem.      
Armed Robbery 
In The Ivory Coast a serious problem of armed robbery grew in the 1980s in 
which armed robbers would identify business offices harboring cash and hold 
employees hostage.  The war since 2002 has favored armed robbery of various types.  
Some criminal gangs in Northern Nigeria have included demobilized ex combatants from 
neighboring countries (United Nations, 2005).  In Sierra Leone too, demobilized fighters 
are recorded as forming armed gangs such as the West Side Boys. Some such groups 
may receive arms from the regular armed forces. They may sell stolen goods in 
neighboring countries, and are also reported to have developed connections as far away 
as Gambia, Mali, and The Ivory Coast (Lengor, 2004).  Senegal’s crime shows an 
extraordinary emphasis on all types of theft.  Senegalese police report groups of up to 
15, armed with automatic weapons, including Guinea-Biassauans, Liberians, and Sierra 
Leoneans, involved in transnational crime.  This is also the case in Casamance and close 
to the northern borders of Senegal with Mali and Mauritania as well.  Individuals are 
believed to be involved in cattle-rustling, smuggling, and armed robbery.  In 2000-2003 
the Senegalese authorities prosecuted 2,400 members of crime groups, 1,500 of those 
were charged with armed robbery.  Armed robbers do, in fact, use violence; hence, a 
large amount of attention from police is focused on such groups resulting in higher 
arrest rates (Niang, 2004).   
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In Benin, one Harmani Tidjani led a multinational-armed gang that specialized in 
car jacking and car theft through several West African countries and even in France.  The 
gang’s activities were so notorious that the Nigerian government closed its border with 
Benin to accentuate its demands for action by the Beninese authorities.  Tidjani, 
however, escaped to Mali, using bribery to facilitate his escape. He was, however, 
subsequently arrested, extradited to Benin and finally Nigeria.  As a result, the President 
of Benin fired 13 senior security officials, including from the Presidency, the Defence 
Ministry and the Ministry of the Interior (Williams, 2004).   
Use of Corruption 
Analyzing crime in West Africa also requires one to consider the controversial 
topic of corruption. While there is no single, comprehensive, universally accepted 
definition of corruption, it is generally considered to be the illegitimate use of public 
resources for private gain and with no doubt it exists in all countries world wide in some 
shape or form.  Corrupt conduct typically includes bribery, embezzlement, theft, and 
fraud, extortion, abuse of discretion, favoritism, and discrimination, the exploitation of 
conflicting interests, and improper political donations.  These conducts all pertain to 
crime committed in the context of a public-service occupation or responsibility (Shehu, 
2004).  As researcher Abdullahi Y. Shehu concluded, corruption in Nigeria has become a 
way of life under socioeconomic conditions that not only facilitate corruption but make 
it necessary for economic survival for even the most conscientious citizen.  Military rule 
has been blamed for allowing corruption to grow unchecked.  When President Olusegun 
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Obasanjo was inaugurated as a civilian president of Nigeria on May 29th, 1999 he 
identified corruption as Nigeria’s most pressing problem vowing to fight it at every level.  
Despite these reform efforts, corruption in Nigeria has not declined, and there is some 
evidence that it is occurring at high government levels (Shehu, 2004).   
Widespread corruption has many horrendous consequences, including 
inefficiency, mistrust of the government by citizens, discouragement of enterprise, and 
political instability.  A high level of corruption stems from a wide discrepancy between 
the attitudes and objectives of a government and those of the society in which it 
operates.  Pre-colonial West African society had a primitive bureaucracy and money 
played a minor role. According to an article released by the University of Keele of the 
United Kingdom, traditional customs such as exchange gifts and extended families, 
contributed to corruption only when they came into contact with colonial society.  The 
most important areas of divergence between the colonial government and the West 
Africans were the operations of a literature government in an illiterate society and 
conflicts between laws and popular attitudes.  When only those who can read and write 
are admitted into public service, the illiterate majority often resorts to bribing the 
lowest public functionaries in order to cope with regulations that they do not 
understand.  In turn, minor public servants can use power over illiterates to increase 
their pay.  Laws made in attempt to prohibit activities favored by the public are 
vulnerable to corruption.  The colonial government imposed many regulations, which 
conflict with traditional attitudes and these conflicts have not disappeared with the 
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coming of independence.  According to this particular piece of research, West Africans 
show no resentment toward proven corruption among high level officials as corruption 
works to soften conflict, reduce friction, and cements relationships between power 
holders and those who control the wealth during the initial stages of national 
development (Fleming, 1957).   
 While this argument may very well explain some of the root causes of 
corruption occurring in this sector of the world it does not emphasize the role that 
Africans themselves played in solidifying the problem. While European ideas of proper 
governance and public administration heavily influenced the formation of newly 
independent African states, the new governments were also formed to a considerable 
extent by the actions and ideas of Africans that fulfilled the hierarchy, most particularly 
in the systems of indirect rule (Bayart, 1993).  Hence, if the historical roots of modern 
systems of political corruption and of political violence can be traced back to colonial 
times, this has to be studied not only in terms of the formal arrangements made by 
European colonial officials, which generally entailed unjustly harsh powers of taxation 
and coercion, but also the formal and informal practices of African agents who 
participated in the colonial system (Williams, 2003).  It has become commonplace for 
African authors to attribute a high degree of responsibility for modern day corruption to 
the African elites that have governed their countries since independence (Ayittey, 
1996).  The suggestion; however, that corruption in modern West Africa is a result of 
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ruling elites who inherited authoritarian colonial systems of governance fails to consider 
the degree to which corruption may be a product of patron-client systems of politics.   
The Patron-Client system is the name given to a particular way of structuring a 
society such that it is organized in a roughly hierarchical structure. Each person in the 
hierarchy has a "patron" above them (perhaps more than one) and a number of clients 
below them. Basically in the patron-client system, people seek to make mutually 
beneficial alliances, with the less powerful people seeking out the more powerful people 
and offering allegiance in exchange for protection and benefits. So if an individual found 
a person he or she wanted as a patron, that individual would offer his or her allegiance 
to them as a client, promising to do what he or she can to enhance their patron’s honor.  
In return for service their patron might grant his/her client or a friend of the client’s to a 
position in government or some other favor the client wants. Hence society is made up 
of this huge web of tree-like structures of Patron-Client relationships. The clients offer 
their faithfulness and the patron responds by granting favors. Clients could ask 
particular favors of their patrons, or alternatively a patron could shower their clients 
with gifts, and the client was then expected to praise in extravagant terms their patron's 
generosity to others thus increasing the patron's honor. Of course if one client has a 
reputation for extravagantly praising his or her patron for their gifts, other patrons 
would seek that particular client out, wanting to effectively invest in that client, giving 
him or her gifts in exchange for being publicly praised.  Thus corruption was used by 
individuals at all levels of society having roots deep in the history of Africa, and not only 
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in the apparatus of colonial control (Williams, 2003). At what point then does this type 
of activity no longer classify as corruption, which suggest certain behavior is out of the 
ordinary and instead qualify as a description of business as usual? 
The work of crime groups is facilitated if they are able to enlist the complicity, 
active or passive, of state officials and without a doubt this occurs in West Africa (United 
Nations, 2005).  For example, the January 2004 arrest of an international smuggling 
gang in Ghana that had imported no less than 675 kilograms of cocaine, with a street 
value estimated at $140 million US dollars, led to the suspects being released on bail of 
just $200,000 US dollars, causing a great outcry in the press.  Both the Minister of the 
Interior, Hackman Owusu Agyeman, and the Attorney-General, Paapa Owusu Ankomah, 
objected, demanding the incarceration of the suspects.  A leading Ghanaian researcher 
reports that even those who work for the narcotics Control Boar are scared to confront 
the levels of corruption in the criminal justice system (Aning, 2004).  There are other 
examples from Ghana suggesting that criminals are able to bribe judges. The Ivory Coast 
minister of justice has hinted at a very similar state of affairs, referring to the country’s 
justice system as “wrecked” (Sissoko, 2004).  The anti-corruption organization 
Transparency International publishes an annual Corruption Perceptions Index.  In its 
2003 index, Ghana ranks at number 50, Senegal 66, The Ivory Coast 71 (the same as the 
Russian Federation and India), while Nigeria was ranked at 101, deemed the second 
most corrupt country in the world (Williams, 2004).   
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The interface between crime and politics, or crime and legitimate business, 
straddles the grey area of corruption.  Although there is a considerable amount of 
literature on corruption, only a small part of the research that has been done seems 
useful for addressing this issue as it actually occurs in West Africa (Williams, 2004). 
Corruption is often hidden, or at least is not openly admitted by its perpetrators and is 
rarely proven to a legal standard in a court of law making very little information 
available to assess the extent of to which criminal groups make use of it.   
Political Influence 
 In Ghana, a former head of the Narcotics Control Board has indicated drug 
dealers are able to influence certain politicians (Aning, 2004).  But perhaps the most 
blatant case of political involvement with criminal networks in the region of West Africa 
concerns the late Maurice Ibekwe, a member of Nigeria’s Federal House of 
Representatives arrested for financial fraud, forgery, and conspiracy.  He had served as 
Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Police Affairs (Alemika, 2004).  Most security 
officials in Ghana, however, reject any suggestion that drug dealers may influence 
certain politicians, although some do make such allegations.  There are cases, however, 
where people in authority try to stop the trial of people accused of selling drugs.  K.B. 
Quantson, former National Security Coordinator and former head of the Narcotics 
Control Board, recounts that in one case, in between the arrest and trial of one 
particular suspect “tremendous pressure was exerted on me from all over to drop the 
case”.  He also accused the Attorney General’s Office of dragging its feet in confiscating 
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the property of the same drug dealer, as stipulated by the law at the time, after they 
had been found guilty and imprisoned.  Some members of the law enforcement 
agencies in Ghana indicate their frustration at the failure to prosecute drug traffickers 
when it is revealed that one particular judge keeps releasing suspects under very 
strange conditions (Aning, 2003).  
In Nigeria, politics are considered highly corrupt by financial enticement.  Many 
wealthy patrons in politics exhibit enormous wealth that has no obvious origin (Alemika, 
2004).  However, only in small number of cases has it be shown beyond reasonable 
doubt that senior political figures like Maurice Ibekwe have been directly implicated in 
the activities of criminal networks.  More common is the ambivalence attributed to 
some politicians in Ghana by an investigator, who noted that many of them are tempted 
to turn a blind eye to crime, believing that it is preferable to the type of war that has 
disfigured some other countries of the region.  This could be taken to suggest that 
criminal interests have become so powerful in some countries that they pose a potential 
political threat.  More realistically, it indicates that some powerful people consider 
crime less as a menace to combat than as a form of activity that at least generates 
income, and therefore may help to alleviate the misery that helps stoke the fires of civil 
war (United Nations, 2005).  Similar attitudes may very well prevail throughout the 
region.   
In regards of political involvement in advance fee fraud, the advance fee fraud 
involving Emmanuel Nwude can again be used to illustrate political involvement as this 
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case suggests a strong connection to Nigerian politics.  Several of those involved were 
connected with the country’s ruling Popular Democratic Party (PDP).  Emmanuel Nwede 
was a prominent supporter, and one of his key accomplices, Dr. Ukeh, was a PDP 
candidate for the position of governor of one of the Nigeria’s states.  It was Dr. Ukeh 
who had first made contact with the Brazilian bank manager who was to be their victim.  
Also involved in the scheme was Maurice Ibekwe, a member of the Federal House of 
Representatives – Nigeria’s lower house of parliament – from 1999 until his arrest.  
Ibekwe even served as chairman of the House’s Subcommittee on Police Affairs, and has 
been reelected in the 2003 parliamentary elections as a candidate of the PDP, the ruling 
party (Alemika 2004, Eriye 2004).    
Overall, then there is little evidence – with some alarming exceptions – to 
suggest that politicians may be directly involved with criminal networks, but much of 
the evidence suggests they may be complicit in various ways ranging from an 
unwillingness to contemplate the issue of transnational crime and criminal groups 
involved, to a complicity that is hard to distinguish from corruption.  There may be, 
however, some major cases of direct political involvement in crime that are covered up 
due to their political sensitivity.  For example, in Nigeria the illegal export of oil, or oil 
bunkering, is said by observers to be facilitated by political authorities at very high levels 
(Ebbe, 1999).  It has become common practice for politicians to benefit from the profits 
of oil bunkering by using money to help fund political campaigns (Vines, 2004).   
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In countries where full-scale war develops, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, it 
becomes difficult to distinguish between the activities of criminal networks and political 
violence.  There are now disturbing signs that a similar evolution may take place in The 
Ivory Coast.  The robbery of a bank in Bouake, the second largest city in The Ivory Coast, 
under control of the rebel Forces Nouvelles movement, was reportedly organized by 
one of the leaders of the rebellion, and a major bank hold up in Abidjan in 2002 is also 
believed to have been organized by a future leader of the insurrection, make clear the 
close connection between political violence and crime (United Nations, 2005).  This also 
suggest the formation of a nexus of political disorder that provides a suitable 
environment for crime, creating a triangular logic of disorder, violence, and crime in 
which each become a consequence of the other.   
A similar phenomenon has been noted in Senegal where reports the export of 
marijuana from the Casamance region towards other parts of Senegal is favored by 
conditions of low intensity conflict (Niang, 2004).  Not only does the organization of 
armed struggle require financing, which increasingly may come from criminal activity, 
but in extreme cases the state itself may become under the control of professional 
criminals (Napoleoni, 2003).  Some observers would have considered this to be the case 
of Liberia under the presidency of Charles Taylor, from 1997-2003.  The rebellion of the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone has often been presented in such a 
manner.  A Sierra Leonean police officer notes the significance in this regard of the 
RUF’s having obliged the legitimate government of the country to share power, allowing 
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the RUF’s leader, Foday Sankoh, to occupy a position equivalent to that of a vice 
president and gaining control of the precious minerals department of the government 
(Lengor, 2004).  The Sierra Leonean president, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, has represented 
the war in his country as a criminal enterprise on a national scale (Lengor, 2004).  
Indeed, the Sierra Leone police report that members of the Armed Forces Ruling 
Council, the group of military officers that had power 1997-1998, themselves pioneered 
the use of Sierra Leone as a transit point in the transnational drug trade (Lengor, 2004).  
In such cases distinctions between crime and political activity become difficult, since the 
authorities responsible for enforcing the law of the land may themselves be organizers 
of criminal activity (Williams, 2004). 
Connection to Legitimate Entrepreneurs & Investors 
Different groups of individuals tend to cooperate instead of compete in order to 
more successfully complete business transactions.  It appears that, whereas the old 
established “mafias” where thought to have the ability to transport very large quantities 
of narcotics to the United States, the most successful West African syndicates import 
smaller quantities but enjoy an exceptional range of contacts and an impressive 
flexibility of organization that enables them to exploit market niches that the major 
mafias cannot always reach.  It is by these means that West African drug traders have 
managed to gain a major stake in what is, literally, the world’s most cut throat market, 
without the need to use violence (Williams, 2004).   Ad hoc relationships created within 
the criminal networks of West Africa allow groups to collaborate sporadically and 
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sometimes anonymously to avoid detection from law enforcement and to refrain from 
infringing on market territories of larger more powerful groups.  In a way, West African 
crime groups have found a way to penetrate market opportunity by offering larger 
groups with a means to an end in manufacturing, transporting, and providing goods and 
services illicitly. 
 Specialists in different aspects of crime in West Africa claim long-term 
specialization in a particular field or commodity is rather rare.  An entrepreneur who has 
been successful in one field of operation may move into another field if the opportunity 
presents itself, including that of legitimate commerce.  For example, an entrepreneur 
who has been successful in the drug trade may invest his or her profits in a legitimate 
business, not purely as a form of camouflage, but simply in pursuit of a commercial 
logic.  By the same token, an entrepreneur who has become established in a field such 
as the import of cars or spare parts may use the capital, the infrastructure and the 
commercial contacts thus acquired to move into some branch of illicit commerce.  In 
The Ivory Coast too, the police find that individuals of legit business enterprises may be 
members of one or several crime groups simultaneously.  In the 1980s and 1990s, such 
groups were involved in armed robbery and drug trafficking, according to Ivorian 
sources (Sissoko, 2004). 
 Massive illegal transactions take place in the field of foreign exchange fraud, 
often involving international companies that may conspire in false accounting, thus 
allowing well connected Nigerians to move large amounts of money to bank accounts 
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abroad.  This became a major activity during the 1970s, when practiced by Lebanese, 
Asian, and European companies such as Johnson Mathew bank (Alemika, 2004).  The 
scale of this activity may be appreciated by reference to the billions of dollars stolen by 
senior officials, including a former head of state, General Sani Abacha, much of which 
ended up in western banks (Nwankwo, 1999).    
Transnational Operations 
Overall, transnational crime in West Africa may involve persons of West African 
origin collaborating with others from outside the region – for example, Russian and 
other foreign nationals have been arrested in Nigeria in connection with oil bunkering – 
or it may involve West Africans based in their home region maintaining relations with 
refugees who have since become scattered.  In general, it is difficult to separate the 
regional dimension of transnational crime from its global dimension.  For example, a 
Nigerian-dominated internet fraud group such a the Kakudu group works out of Sierra 
Leone, and has links to Guinea, Gambia, and the Ivory Coast as well as Nigeria, but 
identifies many of its potential victims outside of Africa.  Heroin imported from Asia and 
cocaine from South America maybe moved from one country to another within the 
West African region to evade law enforcement detection, but the ultimate destination is 
almost invariably in a country outside of Africa (Williams, 2004). 
It is not possible to capture accurately all the cross border movements of goods 
within the region, but a number of points may tentatively be made.  First, the classic 
smuggling trades are in goods that have a high international value relative to their bulk, 
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with drugs and diamonds being obvious examples.  They are rather easy to transport in 
quantities that can be carried by a single person and even hidden on the body, and yet 
can be exchanged for very large sums of money upon delivery to a trader based in 
Europe, North America, or elsewhere.  Second, in order to facilitate the transport of 
goods, smugglers may well move them within the West African region.  Nigeria is so well 
established as a source of drugs that Nigerian smugglers clearly prefer to use other 
countries as staging posts.  This may also apply to diamonds, illegal immigrants, or other 
cargoes.  Although such trade can be considered as internal to the West African region, 
it is also linked to other parts of the globe.  The main exception of this concerns goods 
that have low international value relative to their bulk, and therefore are not traded 
outside the West African region.  Examples of these types of goods would include cattle, 
which are smuggled across Senegal’s borders into Guinea- Bissau, but no further, and 
locally manufactured firearms, which are made in Ghana and smuggled into neighboring 
countries, but rarely further than Nigeria (Ebbe, 1999).   
Combating Transnational Crime 
To alleviate the problems facilitated by transnational crime and the actors 
involved previous research calls for a higher level of international law enforcement 
cooperation and communication.  Transnational criminal operations – such as drug 
smuggling, human trafficking, terrorism, and internet-related crimes – have increased 
the need for criminal justice personnel and institutions to establish structures, policies, 
and procedures of cooperation (Lewis, 2007).  This is necessary in order for jurisdictions 
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in which crimes occur to pursue and interview suspects and witnesses in other 
jurisdictions, as well as to have access to documentary evidence that exists in 
jurisdictions other than where victimization occurs.  Currently some of existing 
institutions and structures of international cooperation in addressing transnational 
crime are the United Nations, Interpol, Europol, and the European Union (Aroma, 2006).  
All international bodies have fallen short of the challenges posed by transnational crime.  
This has set the stage for the possibility of the creation of an international coordinating 
body composed of countries whose citizens are most at risk for victimization by 
transnational criminals and terrorists. 
Other strategies for combating transnational crime include the provision of more 
effective protection for witnesses who have inside knowledge of those engaged in 
transnational crime. Reversing the burden of proof so that the offender must prove 
assets of high consumer value were not acquired through criminal proceeds is another 
tactic used to crack down on illegal markets.  The interception of communications along 
with intrusive surveillance is also argued necessary to identify and develop profiles of 
key members of criminal organizations (Aroma, 2006).   While this has raised some 
concern in regard to privacy rights, there is a need for legal administrative measures 
designed to prevent criminal groups from infiltrating and developing legitimate 
businesses by using capital from criminal enterprises. Some researchers suggest host-
nation governments, with the support of the United States Government Special Forces, 
are an even match for criminal/terrorist organizations.   
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“Through a deliberate process of detection utilizing United States and host 
nation assets, network structure and ties can be assessed accordingly.  A process 
of dynamic attenuation, where network ties, and not the actors in the network, 
are targeted should replace the current United States strategy of killing or 
capturing individual criminal agents.  By dynamically attenuating instead of 
destroying the ties between and among criminal actors and criminal 
organizations, the United States can effectively reduce the capability of criminal 
and terrorist organizations from operating and achieving their missions” (Serena, 
2007; 87). 
   
The process by dynamic attenuation actually means to resolve the problem of 
transnational crime through the “energetic shrinking” of the groups involved.  This 
shrinking is brought about by more or less the same tactics, which include arresting 
individuals believed to be associated with organized crime.  Resolutions such as this one 
seem to fall short of the big picture. To focus mainly on how crime groups function in 
order to weaken network ties to, in effect, shrink them, distracts one from addressing 
the reasons for which transnational crime is able to thrive and why it thrives in the first 
place. Regardless of the wars waged against crime, drugs, terrorism, etc., all attempts to 
disrupt criminal networks have failed in the overall grand scheme of what has yet to 
come as transnational crime continues to thrive and remains a seemingly permanent 
component of the capitalist lifestyle. 
Most of the causes of transnational crime are similar to the factors that drive 
crime in general.  The globalization of the economy, increased numbers and diverse 
nature of immigrants, and improved communications facilitate crime or provide criminal 
opportunities, but they do not cause transnational crime. There have been eight 
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different issues identified all relating to the structures, strategies, and tactics of 
transnational crime and to the law enforcement efforts to address this form of 
criminality: 
  The interaction among politics, the media, and resource sharing and the 
resulting tendency to characterize the problem inaccurately while 
making policy and resource allocation decisions that have little to do 
with the control of smuggling of crime of any sort.   
  The need for less rhetoric and more empirical research as a basis for 
policymaking.  Additional issues include  
 The need to focus on criminal markets and conduct a market analysis,  
 The sparse and often unreliable information evaluating the impact of 
transnational crime and the impact of law enforcement efforts to 
address it.  
 Lack of clarity about the concepts of organized crime and organized 
transnational crime.    
 The need to focus on the local bases of transnational crimes  
 The organization of policing for enforcement related to criminal groups 
 Consideration of alternative policing options for law enforcement 
related to transnational crime (Beare & Naylor, 1999; 11).   
 
The challenges involved in the prevention and control of transnational crime can 
stem from varied cultural and societal conditions and from the various national 
orientations for laws and law enforcement (Finckenauer, 2000).  The laws enacted can 
actually do more to facilitate and benefit transnational crime markets rather than 
hinder them, even if the networks involved are countered by “dynamic attenuation”.  
This is why policy made to counter transnational crime is extremely critical.  The final 
section addresses the economic and political climate of West Africa and how the current 
circumstances of this world region do not allow for reactionary individual arrests or 
“dynamic attenuation” to hinder the global problem of transnational crime.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION 
The Structural Adjustment of Africa 
In the first chapter the concepts neo-liberal and neo-conservative politics were 
mentioned as the driving force behind the process of globalization. Neo-conservative 
politics share in the ideals of neo-liberalism by advocating a free market model economy 
and a disdain for social welfare (Kraska 2004). In regards to the present day reality of 
transnational crime in West Africa, Structural Adjustment Programs enacted in West 
Africa by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were founded upon neo 
liberal principles. The structural adjustment programs most certainly contribute to social 
and economic problems faced by countries becoming involved in transnational crime.  
Many African states trying to establish a capitalist economy with the help of loans issued 
by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been struggling to 
pay back debt due to strangling economic effects of the Structural Adjustment 
Programs.  These loans were only issued if borrowing states would abide by certain 
guidelines entailed by The World Bank and the contract of the loan issued by the 
International Monetary Fund.  Under a plan devised by President Reagan’s Secretary to 
the Treasury, James Baker, indebted developing countries were offered World Bank and 
IMF “servicing” loans in return for the “structural adjustment” of their economies. This 
meant that the economic direction of each country would be planned, monitored and 
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controlled in Washington. “Liberal containment” was replaced by laissez-faire capitalism 
known as the “free market” (Pilger, 1998).   
The IMF has prescribed the same medicine for vulnerable state economies for over 
two decades which includes: 
 Monetary austerity. Tightening up the money supply to increase internal interest 
rates to whatever heights needed to stabilize the value of the local currency.  
 Fiscal austerity. Increase tax collections and reduce government spending 
dramatically.  
 Privatization. Sell off public enterprises to the private sector.  
 Financial Liberalization. Remove restrictions on the inflow and outflow of 
international capital as well as restrictions on what foreign businesses and banks 
are allowed to buy, own, and operate (Hanhel, 1999). 
President George Bush Jr., will claim that rules based global mechanisms are needed, 
the mainstream media, however, often does not ask what the rules themselves are, and 
whether they are most appropriate. The IMF/World Bank plans are actually devised in 
secret and are not open for discussion or dissent (Stiglitz, 1999).  Since the introduction 
of the IMF structural “assistance” Africa's income has dropped by 23 percent (Colgan, 
2002). The basic assumption behind structural adjustment was that a free unregulated 
market would bring benefits to both the poor and the rich. In the Darwinian world of 
international markets, the strongest would win out. This would encourage others to 
follow their example. The development of a capitalist economy with an increase in the 
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role of the private sector was thought to be the ideal way to stimulate economic growth 
(Hahnel, 1999). African countries do, in fact, require essential investments in health, 
education and infrastructure. The World Bank and IMF instead require countries to 
reduce state support and protection for social and economic sectors. They insisted on 
pushing weak African economies into markets where they were unable to compete with 
the might of the transnational private sector. These policies further undermined the 
economic development of African countries (Colgan, 2002).  The key issue with 
structural adjustments of this kind, however, is whether they build the capacity to 
recover and whether they promote long term development. The adjustments dictated 
by the World Bank and IMF did neither (Stiglitz, 1999).  In these ways then, the IMF and 
World Bank encouraging new states to open up for foreign trade and investment is too 
aggressive.  While this is often described as putting new states on a level playing field 
with wealthier countries, wealthy countries are usually far more powerful and with 
more resources at hand, create anything but an even playing field. Most new states 
transitioning into a capitalist market system rule will lose.  Because some of the poor 
nations are not as aggressive in privatization and other conditionality’s, as the IMF or 
World Bank would like, they face continual delays of debt relief fueling the spread and 
profitability of markets conducted illegally at the transnational level. 
The epidemic of transnational crime in the region of West Africa could perhaps be a 
consequence of the economic hardships endeavored by countries finding themselves 
locked economically and politically by the confines of Structural Adjustment Programs. 
The economic policies encouraged by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
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do much to foster a hospitable environment for transnational crime by deregulating the 
market and encouraging free trade across the globe.  The economic desperation that 
occurs when profits from exports are unable to keep up with the price of imports 
needed for basic necessities of human survival fosters not only a hostile environment, 
but also a criminal environment, by making the fast hard cash of illicit markets even 
more appealing.  
Most importantly transnational crime, as it exist in West Africa, and in comparison 
with other regions around the world, is prevalent not as a result of evil, conspiring, large 
corporate entities looking to monopolize illicit markets, but as an ending result of poor 
economic planning and the implication of condemning foreign economic policy.   The 
actors involved have structured themselves to function just as any other capitalist 
business enterprise would, through a series of networks involving as little or as many 
individuals necessary to finish a job. The use of the term “group” when describing the 
collaboration of individuals should be done with extreme caution due to the fact 
individuals often conspire together on a one time basis only to involve other partners 
when another business opportunity arises or specialization in a specific area is needed. 
Structural Adjustment Programs encourage corruption and undermine democracy 
by making elected governments accountable to Washington-based institutions instead 
of their own people.  In some cases, corrupt governments have borrowed money from 
these institutions and/or directly from various donor nations and ended up using that 
money to pursue conflicts, for arms deals, or to divert resources away from their 
people. However, in most cases that has been done knowingly, with the support of 
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various rich nations due to their own “national interests” (Colgan, 2002).  While the 
conditional terms of loans issued by The World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund may be described as “reforms”, “adjustments”, “restructuring” or some other 
benign-sounding term, the effects on the poor are the same if not worse than those 
inflicted by transnational crime.   While the illicit enterprises and criminal activity 
associated with transnational crime may have devastating effects on the stability of 
governments and their ability to effectively meet the basic necessities of their people, 
the infractions do not compare to the devastation inflicted by the Structural Adjustment 
Programs based on neo-liberal politics.  A critical interpretation of structural 
adjustments and other trade related policies could see them as forms of transnational 
crime or terrorism in and of itself. Transnational crime helps to illustrate how the 
injustices occurring at the macro level trickle down to effect society at the micro level in 
which a rise in crime, corruption, and armed conflict will inherently occur. It is such 
trade policy implemented by the World Bank that inadvertently has given rise to illicit 
international markets, armed conflict, and high levels of international fraud that have 
become not only necessary and vital components for economic survival, but favorable in 
markets that thrive on unrestricted, unregulated expansion and profit potential.  
Conclusion 
Transnational crime, according to the information gathered for the purpose of 
this project, appears to be an unintended consequence of the process of globalization, 
the creation of not only one world capitalist economy but of one uniform culture.   
Transnational crime, then, cannot be hindered by individual interceptions of smugglers 
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caught at the border or by the arrest of alleged crime group members. Instead of asking 
whom to arrest in order to hinder illicit transnational markets, it may be more beneficial 
to examine how capitalism, criminal policy, prohibition, war, and politicking all 
collaborate to create the environment in which it is extremely profitable and worth the 
risk to engage in transnational crime. If the focus of transnational crime research 
continues to only consider the individuals involved in order to better intercept and 
arrest them, the problems associated with transnational crime will never be eliminated.  
This practice only serves to legitimate institutions whose mandate is set on criminal 
interception. Transnational crime does not appear to exist due to the isolated activity of 
various transnational criminal groups.  Instead, it seems to be a consequence of 
capitalism which promotes a free unrestricted market, the consumption of goods, and a 
profit driven enterprise.  The capitalist notion of the accumulation of large sums of 
money drives entrepreneurs to seek out profit potential in alternative ways. A sovereign 
state carries with it the burden of enacting law through the interpretation of the few 
who wish to maintain the legitimacy of their rule and will set up institutions in order to 
reinforce those rules and standards of conformity.  A class struggle occurs in the 
continuation of the process of globalization and its inflictions on the division of labor 
and the material conditions for which those members of the state have available to 
them.  When the material conditions to not meet the vital necessities for life and the 
governments are unable to guarantee vital necessities to ensure the liberty of life, 
alternative means will be made to see such needs are met.  
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Conflictions with market demands and the material conditions within a sovereign 
state prevent a free market from flourishing legitimately, especially when involvement 
in legitimate commerce does not make the basic necessities one needs to survive 
accessible.  Young entrepreneurs eagerly look for new opportunities to invest in markets 
outside of the law to make up for a decline in stock.  To encourage new states whose 
borders are not yet stable to engage in free trade inadvertently promotes alternative 
markets, especially when there is the potential to make large amounts of money fast 
and laws enacted against such markets only maximize profit potential (Williams, 2004). 
When such large amounts of money are at stake capitalist culture and ideology help 
perpetuate markets that generate a substantial profit, whether they are licit or illicit, 
national or transnational. 
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